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Social utopia, election economy
Social security always was and remains today the 
most erogenous zone for Ukrainian voters. It is freely 
stimulated by the country’s political leaders as they 
attempt to bring the electorate its latest political fris-
son and to gain more seats and power in return for 
the thrill. This all has its roots in soviet times, in the 
idealized enticements that elderly Ukrainians like 
to bring up to this day: free medicine and education, 
and wages and pensions that allowed for a comfort-
able existence.
The highly sensitive nature of social benefits is com-
pletely natural, as their impact is directly and imme-
diately felt by most ordinary Ukrainians. Massive 
investment projects require decades; even a serious 
improvement in the business climate takes years. 
Only social benefits can be easily raised within a 
month. Because of their lightning-fast effect on vot-
ers and the short-term euphoria that results, such 
steps have more than once been compared to inject-
ing a drug. Would it not be better for Ukrainians to 
kick their social benefit “habit” before they over-
dose on populism in the form of another economic 
crisis?
If we were to chart the intensity of policy decisions 
in the social sphere, it would come as no surprise to 
anyone that the greatest activity matches election 
cycles. Moreover, the political rationale for these 
decisions generally overrides economic consider-
ations. Instantaneous pension hikes under Leonid 
Kuchma and the recent increase in social standards 
are only two examples among a plethora.
In terms of their expectations of social policy, Ukrai-
nians appear to still be at the level of children’s sto-
ries about the nice wizard who shows movies for free 
and hands out ice cream bars. If someone like that 
were to run for the legislature or declare himself a 
candidate for the Presidency, his victory would only 
be a matter of time. The success of the Chernovets-
kiy campaign in the case of a single city, Kyiv, con-
firms that this hypothesis would work on a national 
scale, too.
Ukrainians still have not learned to understand what 
the state can or cannot provide for us, rather than 
demanding that it provide “everything.” We be-
lieve politicians’ fairy tales about rivers of milk with 
banks of Jell-O at the same time as we have a sub-
sistence minimum—set by those same politicians—
that could only keep a household pet alive. Maybe 
the example and experience of our near and more 
distant European neighbors could help us separate 
the rational grain from the chaff of political rhetoric 
and to see how naked our emperors really are.
The theory and practice of social policy 
in Ukraine
Promises, promises: A “social” rating of top 
candidates
Aside from offering the opportunity to hear the lat-
est set of tales about Ukraine’s bright future and to 
enjoy the latest twists in negative PR, the presiden-
tial election provides a useful opportunity to analyze 
and compare the positions of key candidates on such 
a critically important issue for most voters as social 
policy. This will establish the relative positions of the 
main political players on the ideological map, to line 
up their social vectors and to evaluate how their de-
clared approach matches their actual deeds.
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The label “social” is attached in this analysis both to 
matters that are directly related to the functioning 
of the system of social standards, pensions and so-
cial security, and to broader measures from tangen-
tial spheres of public policy, especially healthcare 
and education. Still, the ambitious social programs 
that engorge the political platforms of most Presi-
dential candidates look fairly strange, given that 
current law does not actually provide the President 
with enough powers to actually carry them out.
Nevertheless, we propose rating the six main can-
didates according to where they stand in terms of 
the social planks of their platforms, from the most 
liberal to the nearly socialist.
The American Dream in Ukraine
The least socially oriented politician in Ukraine 
turned out to be Serhiy Tihipko. His unusually la-
conic election platform actually does not touch on 
social issues as such. Nor does this candidate’s list of 
priorities—which includes a competitive economy, 
a strong state and a well-developed democracy—
mention them. What’s more, Mr. Tihipko is possibly 
the only one of the major candidates for President 
who uses openly liberal slogans in his campaign. 
This makes it look like Serhiy Tihipko is a fan of the 
American model, where the social sphere accompa-
nies economic development and the state guaran-
tees only the absolute minimum level of social pro-
tection.
Among the few social aspects in Mr. Tihipko’s plat-
form planks, his plans for education stand out. In 
contrast to most other politicians, this candidate is 
not interested in socializing education or turning 
it into an instrument for supporting young people 
by increasing state procurements. Rather, he states 
that “reviving the educational system will ensure a 
Ukrainian breakthrough.” Unfortunately, Mr. Tihip-
ko’s platform says nothing about how exactly this is 
to be achieved.
Serhiy Tihipko’s plans in the demographic sphere 
are no less ambitious. Specifically, his platform 
mentions that “Ukrainians will have more children.” 
At the same time, it is noted that “state demographic 
policy should be subordinated to the interests of in-
dividual families.” Still, the questions of how a high-
er birthrate will actually be generated if Mr. Tihipko 
is elected President and how this might relate to the 
interests of an “individual family” remain open.
Liberal populism
The penultimate spot for social orientation went to 
Arseniy Yatseniuk. His election platform also largely 
ignores social issues. Altogether, the content of his 
platform is such that only the occasional phrase and 
hint allows us to say anything about Mr. Yatseniuk 
having a definite ideological foundation. This politi-
cian also espouses liberal values and even outstrips 
Mr. Tihipko in this, as he admits that the state has 
somewhat greater social obligations. Specifically, 
Mr. Yatseniuk’s platform states that “when it comes 
to the health, education and culture of the nation, 
profits have no place.”
Mr. Yatseniuk proposes “redesigning” public 
healthcare and educational systems, to allow them 
to become “more competitive with private provid-
ers in these spheres.” Recognizing the need, not just 
to provide social services but also to improve their 
competitiveness clearly puts this politician in a fa-
vorable light. However, the absence of any concrete 
proposals on improving status quo casts doubt on 
his ability to reach his declared goals. 
What’s more, it is unlikely that Ukraine’s private 
medical and educational services can be deemed 
a shining example of quality and competitiveness. 
That means that an improperly chosen goal could 
result in a chain of errors in all subsequent steps.
In the best traditions of political rhetoric
Although Viktor Yushchenko’s campaign platform 
is only fourth in terms of social orientation, it has a 
much more substantial social component than the 
platforms of the previous two politicians. The social 
planks of the Yushchenko platform are grouped in a 
separate section called “Ukraine must be just.”
Whereas Mssrs. Tihipko and Yatseniuk can be clas-
sified as liberally oriented, the next three candi-
dates, starting with Mr. Yushchenko, belong to the 
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social-democratic camp, which tries to combine 
economic freedom with the principles of social jus-
tice. The last concept is key to the platform of Viktor 
Yushchenko.
Mr. Yushchenko promises to “establish a fair, trans-
parent formula for calculating wages and pensions.” 
More specifically, he wants to set up a “fair relation-
ship between pay levels among all public employ-
ees” and to reduce the gap between the minimum 
and maximum pensions. Indeed, he says the mini-
mum pension should be equal to a real subsistence 
minimum.
On the other hand, Mr. Yushchenko states that his 
principle is that “the rich should pay more than 
the poor,” although he provides no specific instru-
ments for achieving this goal, other than instituting 
a special tax on “luxury items.” This puts into ques-
tion whether Mr. Yushchenko is being consistent in 
terms of establishing a fairer distribution of social 
wealth.
Starting with Viktor Yushchenko, political plat-
forms begin to give education, especially post-sec-
ondary education, a social function that is clearly 
inherited from the old soviet system and not typical 
of western societies. For instance, Mr. Yushchen-
ko’s platform calls for greater state procurements 
(placements in post-secondary institutions that are 
covered by state funds—and that have tended to 
go to the children of parents willing to pay a high 
bribe) “so that all talented children have an oppor-
tunity to study.” Given that the number of state-
funded places in post-secondary institutions is al-
ready at exceptionally high in Ukraine by European 
standards, there are doubts about how effective this 
kind of use of limited public resources is and what 
the future fate of such a number of specialists on the 
labor market will be.
One interesting instrument that Viktor Yushchenko 
wants to institute in socio-demographic policy is 
to reduce the working day by an hour while main-
taining the current wages for mothers with children 
who are of the pre-school or primary school age. Al-
though the likelihood that such an instrument can 
be applied universally and its real impact raise con-
siderable doubts, shifting the focus from direct pay-
ments at childbirth to indirect means of influencing 
the birthrate is clearly a positive signal.
Heaven on earth—as soon as the crisis ends
Yulia Tymoshenko is in third place among candi-
dates running for President for her level of social 
orientation. One of the goals of her election plat-
form is “to overcome poverty and social injustice.” 
To achieve this, Ms. Tymoshenko also plans to in-
stitute special luxury taxes and to increase the mini-
mum share of “wages in production costs to world 
levels.”
A considerable part of Ms. Tymoshenko’s platform 
is dedicated to pension reforms, especially to in-
stitute an accumulative pension system. Without 
any doubt, this important reform is long overdue in 
Ukraine, but even the most successful implementa-
tion of this reform is likely to suffice to fulfill Ms. 
Tymoshenko’s next promise: “Pensions should be 
no less than 60% of the average wage that the indi-
vidual earned prior to retirement.”
Yulia Tymoshenko’s social claim to fame is the re-
turn of deposits lost in the Soviet Union’s Oschadny 
Bank, state savings bank. This money is supposed 
to be fully paid back over the course of three years. 
Still, it’s worth noting that the means used to achieve 
this, so far, has led to such high inflationary pressure 
on the economy that it can only be compared to a 
direct emission. Among other social guarantees, she 
wants to raise student stipends to the subsistence 
minimum and to institute guaranteed medical insur-
ance “paid for by the employer or the state.”
As Ms. Tymoshenko understands it, the main in-
strument for socio-demographic policy remains to 
pay people to have babies. She has taken on an ad-
ditional commitment to “revive long-term mortgage 
lending at 2-4% for 10- to 30-year terms immediately 
the crisis is over.” The idea of “reviving” something 
that, even at the best of times, Ukrainians could only 
dream of, raises a few eyebrows, while the phrase 
“immediately the crisis is over” gives Ms. Tymosh-
enko considerable leeway, time-wise, making us 
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wonder if any of today’s Ukrainians will live to see 
that grand day.
The fruitful demographer
Second in the ranks of candidates in terms of social 
orientation, unexpectedly, turned out to be Viktor 
Yanukovych. Although a strong social component 
was always a distinctive feature of his main oppo-
nent, Yulia Tymoshenko, this time Mr. Yanukovych 
has gone way further than most of his rivals in terms 
of social commitments made in his election plat-
form.
What distinguishes Mr. Yanukovych’s platform is 
its distinctly European approach to forming social 
standards. Among others, the platform talks about 
the need to “satisfy cultural needs and the opportu-
nity to acquire big-ticket household items.” It also 
talks about “establishing a minimum pension that 
can cover the basic needs of each individual: hous-
ing, food and medical treatment.”
One of the priorities in Viktor Yanukovych’s plat-
form is a demographic policy aimed at increasing 
Ukraine’s birthrate. Its main instrument is the tradi-
tional maternity benefit paid at childbirth, which he 
claims he will double by 2011. In addition, he plans 
to make greater use of payments for childcare and to 
extend such family allowance-type payments until 
the child reaches 18.
Mr. Yanukovych also plans to revive mortgage lend-
ing “with a fixed interest rate of no more than 7% 
p.a.,” which looks slightly more realistic than Ms. 
Tymoshenko’s “2-4%.” In addition, Viktor Yanu-
kovych proposes using an instrument that is widely 
applied in many European countries to handle the 
“housing issue,” that is, public housing. Still, even 
in the highly unlikely case that he fulfills the entire 
list of promises, Mr. Yanukovych’s aim to have “50 
million Ukrainians in 2020” sounds utopian, as the 
most optimistic demographic projections suggest a 
number that is closer to 40 million.
Mr. Yanukovych also sees education as a social 
function. Specifically, his platform guarantees “in-
creasing the proportion of state-funded placements 
in public post-secondary institutions to 75%.” The 
question is, why 75%? What purpose would this 
serve, given that Ukraine is already one of the top 
countries in the world in terms of the proportion of 
its workforce having a post-secondary degree?
In addition to the nigh-universal promise of candi-
dates to provide higher pensions and social benefits, 
housing and an education, the Yanukovych plat-
form contains know-how that is somewhat in contra-
diction to its largely social-democratic planks. The 
intention is to institute state “anti-crisis” consumer 
and medical “baskets,” that is, lists of foodstuffs, 
medicines and medical services that will be subject 
to price-controls. This immediately brings to mind 
the kind of hand-managing of the economy that Mr. 
Yanukovych apparently eschewed when he accused 
his political opponents of doing so. As they say, re-
move the beam from thine own eye…
Ukraine’s Hugo Chavez
Volodymyr Lytvyn has not only proved to be the 
most socially-oriented of the top candidates for the 
Presidency, but his platform also differs significant-
ly from those of all his opponents. Our analysis of 
the platforms of key candidates shows that the rest 
range ideologically from liberal to social-democrat-
ic, while Mr. Lytvyn’s is hard to call anything but 
socialist.
This candidate’s platform is one of the most detailed 
and most focused on social issues. The majority of his 
key objectives “in the social and economic spheres” 
actually ignore economic considerations and are fo-
cused only on social ones. Moreover, they combine 
both quite justified approaches to public policy that 
would bring the country closer to European stan-
dards and frankly utopian soviet-style declarations 
that are in complete opposition to the principles of a 
market economy.
Among the former are such points as “dropping the 
system of calculating minimum wages and replac-
ing it with a social consumption standard based on 
the calculation of expenditures.” The latter include 
plans to renationalize water and sewage systems, 
gas and power networks, and natural gas and petro-
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leum fields, and to institute state control over prices 
for medications, foodstuffs and primary goods.
To call Mr. Lytvyn’s promises to “raise the share of 
labor in production costs from 8% to 30%, to raise 
pensions to 80% of the average national wage, and to 
establish a ratio of no more than 5 to 1 between maxi-
mum and minimum wages” utopian and unrealistic is 
to put it mildly. Moreover, he provides neither an in-
dication of the basis for establishing such a ratio nor a 
mechanism for regulating the maximum salary.
Alongside the tax “on wealth” that is so popular 
among this year’s candidates, the Lytvyn platform 
calls for a progressive tax system, while alongside 
traditional funding for public housing and the pro-
vision of construction loans, he says he intends to 
establish “fair rates for utilities and building main-
tenance services.” Unfortunately, Mr. Lytvyn’s plat-
form does not indicate what he will use as a basis 
for establishing a “fair” rate. For instance, if market 
principles underlie such a concept, then it turns out 
that utility rates have a long way to rise yet.
One plus in the Lytvyn platform worth noting is 
some interesting demographic policy instruments. 
Firstly, he talks about “providing young families 
with discounted housing loans; writing off 25% of 
the principle of the loan after the birth of the first 
child, 50% after the birth of the second, and full re-
lief when a third child is born. This kind of approach 
would actually be a more effective use of public 
money, stimulating larger families while providing 
more decent housing for ordinary Ukrainians.
No less worthy of notice is the approach to returning 
lost soviet savings proposed by Volodymyr Lytvyn, 
“including by participating in the privatization of 
closed enterprises, by being granted parcels of land, 
by being provided with medical and educational 
services at state cost, and by being relieved of utility 
charges.” These proposals are more economically 
sound and represent fewer inflationary threats than 
direct payments of cash as was partly done by Pre-
mier Tymoshenko last year. Still, the mechanisms 
suggested by Mr. Lytvyn are very close to the exist-
ing system of privileges in the residential services, 
healthcare and educational systems, while the priva-
tization scheme smacks too much of the voucher 
system used in the 1990s. Both of these approaches 
have long been discredited, to say the least.
Volodymyr Lytvyn is the only leading Ukrainian 
politician who did not ignore the issue of gender 
parity in Ukraine. Among others, his platform pro-
poses “eliminating disproportions in pensions pro-
vided to men and women.”
Suspecting the usual lines
In short, the majority of Ukraine’s top politicians 
have taken on a myriad of social commitments with-
out burdening their platforms with concrete pol-
icy proposals that might allow them to keep these 
promises. And where such solutions are offered, the 
reality and meaningfulness of their actual imple-
mentation raises more questions than it answers. 
Statistical information used in most platforms look 
like the fruit of an over-active imagination rather 
than the result of objective calculations and suitable 
conclusions.
A practical exercise: Raising social standards
How consistent politicians are depends on how 
much their words match their deeds. Ukraine’s lead-
ers have never found themselves short on words, 
and this time they were also not short on actions. 
In the best traditions of the election economy, the 
first signal, long before the start of the official elec-
tion race, was the adoption of the infamous Law “On 
establishing a subsistence minimum and minimum 
wage” dated 20 October 2009. This was preceded by 
the dropping of a moratorium on raising social ben-
efits that had been adopted as one of the conditions 
of the IMF.
What went wrong?
The adopted Law was to bring a second wave of rais-
es in social standards as of 1 January 2010, starting 
with the subsistence minimum and minimum wage. 
The first wave took place back in November 2009, 
but the Government has so far managed to success-
fully ignore its requirements. Moreover, the Law re-
quires changes to be made to the State Budget, but 
this did not take place in 2009. If we presume that, 
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sooner or later, this Law will have to be enacted, it is 
important to understand what kind of an impact on 
the economy and on the country as a whole it will 
have.
Firstly, pressure on the State Budget will grow, as 
the size of the minimum wage is used to formulate 
the pay scales for all public employees. The subsis-
tence minimum, in turn, is the basis for determin-
ing most kinds of social assistance. Secondly, it has 
already put greater pressure on businesses, as the 
increase in the subsistence minimum and minimum 
wage have pushed employer payroll contributions 
up as well.
As a result, if the calculations of Ukraine’s Finance 
Ministry are to be believed, an additional UAH 8 
billion were needed in 2009 to cover the new social 
standards—and an additional UAH 71bn in 2010. 
Meanwhile, total expenditures in the 2009 State 
Budget were only UAH 274bn.
Roughly speaking, this means that, for every month 
last year, about UAH 23bn in spending was planned 
in the Budget, while the last two months, when the 
new social standards came into effect, an additional 
UAH 4bn were needed—a rise of 17% per month in 
the expenditure side of the country’s Budget.
We could argue long and loudly about how objec-
tive and accurate MinFin’s calculations are, but 
the reality is that even the figures already set in the 
2009 Budget were not properly fulfilled. Of course, 
this did not concern its socially protected and most 
politically sensitive components: wages, pensions 
and social assistance continued to be issued without 
major hold-ups. Any cutbacks in these expenditures 
would have been political suicide across the board, 
both for the current Government and for any other 
one. Still, the state has been paying out its social 
commitments for some time now at the expense of 
other, less broadly recognized public projects and 
commitments.
One example is the widespread practice of not re-
funding or selectively refunding exporters their VAT 
payments, underfunding of the military, education 
and science, reducing funding for the support and 
maintenance of state institutions, and increasing 
indebtedness for residential services at publicly-
funded organizations, and so on. What’s more, even 
de facto reduced spending takes place at the cost of 
increased public debt. This means, even without any 
additional spending, it is hard to talk about the 2009 
Budget as being properly carried out, so raising so-
cial standards will only complicate the situation.
Groundwork for the future
Until this election is over, we are unlikely to see ma-
jor changes to Budget or social policy in Ukraine. 
Still, sooner or later the election will be over, the 
Budget will be adopted and the Government, what-
ever it might be, will have to carry it out.
Of course, we might suppose that the new Budget 
will be adopted based on the old social standards 
and the Law raising them will be cancelled. Still, giv-
en the current political situation in Ukraine, no Gov-
ernment is likely to allow themselves this luxury. It 
also makes little sense to expect that public sector 
salaries, pensions or social benefits will see major 
hold-ups or growing arrears. Theoretically, the Gov-
ernment will only resort to this in the most extreme 
case, when all other resources have dried up.
Thus, the likeliest scenario is that the norms of this 
law will be upheld and social standards will be raised, 
which will cause Budget spending to skyrocket. In 
this case, two main consequences are likely.
The first of these already made its appearance as the 
current Government systematically acted since the 
very start of the crisis: covering socially protected 
payments at the expense of other Budget articles. 
This means the state will fail in its commitments in 
other spheres that are actually no less important 
for the country and could result in major potential 
threats. This includes threats to national security, 
healthcare and residential services.
The second likely trend could be a continuing de-
valuation of the hryvnia as a result of growing infla-
tion and downward pressure on the national curren-
cy. The current nominal rise in disposable incomes 
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is not economically grounded, as it reflects neither 
GDP growth nor a rise in productivity. The state’s 
inability to carry out the significantly larger volume 
of social commitments without an emission, whether 
direct or indirect in the form of internal borrowing, 
is already nearly axiomatic—with familiar, disheart-
ening implications.
On the one hand, such a turn of events would ben-
efit the Government, as inflation automatically in-
creases Budget revenues. On the other, a devalued 
hryvnia causes the cost of external loans to go up 
while inflation causes the cost of procurements of 
goods, works and services to rise. In the end, the fi-
nal goal will not be reached, since, no matter what 
the nominal increase in social standards, their real 
size could actually decline.
It’s worth noting that a further devaluation of the 
hryvnia could actually suit most of Ukraine’s politi-
cal forces, as it means that export-oriented sectors 
become more price-competitive, especially the steel 
industry, which is largely controlled by members of 
Party of the Regions and BYT.
Quite likely the Government will try other measures 
in order to ensure greater Budget revenues. Indeed, 
efforts to privatize the Odesa Port Plant appear to be 
with just this in mind. Still, the failure of this project 
considerably reduces the options for quickly topping 
up the State Budget through privatization. Another 
source of additional revenues could be foreign cred-
its, which the Government has been actively court-
ing. But the overall shortage of spare capital around 
the globe because of the current crisis means there 
are slim chances that this will accumulate enough 
cash for the Government’s needs. Meanwhile, public 
debt continues to rise towards critical levels, when 
the cost of servicing these debts constitutes a threat 
to the sustainability of the state’s Budget policy and 
its ability to carry out its social commitments.
Don’t trust fortune-tellers
All in all, raising social standards at a time when 
there is an economic crisis is a fairly dangerous de-
cision that will mostly bring negative consequences, 
such as:
Underfunding public spending that is not direct-
ly connected to the state’s social commitments;
Growing inflation and downward pressure on the 
national currency, leading to its further devalua-
tion and growing prices;
Overloading the economy with external and in-
ternal borrowings, leading to a serious rise in the 
cost of servicing public debt;
Ineffectively privatizing state assets. Who sells off 
when asset values have bottomed out? It makes 
little economic sense, as the Odesa Port Plant, as 
an example, was worth several times more just 18 
months ago;
Stimulating the shadow economy through the in-
direct rise in pressures on business as social stan-
dards rise and it becomes highly likely that pres-
sure will increase as the Government looks for 
sources of tax and other revenues for the Budget;
Reducing the tax base of individual taxpayers, 
leading to a reduction in revenues to the State 
Budget.
Still, it is worth noting that there are also some pos-
sible positive consequences from raising social stan-
dards, including:
Growing real disposable incomes that could, 
however, be wiped out by both devaluation and 
inflation in time;
Injecting serious cash into the country’s econo-
my, spurring demand and fostering a more rapid 
economic recovery from the crisis as consump-
tion revives.
Homework: How this is done in Europe
None of the members of the EU has such a system 
of social standards that is as integrated as the one 
Ukraine has maintained to this day. For most Euro-
pean countries, the poverty level is the closest anal-
ogy to Ukraine’s subsistence minimum, although 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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it is based on the size of the average salary. This is 
the indicator used by France, Germany, Spain and 
Great Britain. Meantime, countries like Poland have, 
in addition to the poverty level, such indicators as 
subsistence and social minimums, which are deter-
mined according to the amount of money needed to 
survive physically and the amount needed to satisfy 
basic social needs.
Moreover, EU countries use such indicators typical-
ly only for statistical tracking and not to determine 
social transfers, as is the case in Ukraine. Instead, 
the latter are calculated separately for each socially 
vulnerable group or even individual households or 
persons, based on their specific needs. One of the 
exceptions, again, is Poland, where the poverty line 
is used to calculate all social benefits.
Most European countries, like Ukraine, legislate 
minimum wages. Still, this indicator is only a limit 
in the EU, meaning that no one should receive less 
for their work, and not the basis for determining the 
salaries of employees in the public sector, as is done 
in Ukraine. Specific categories of wages are distin-
guished by their clear rules, which gives the state 
the option of having a targeted impact on wage con-
ditions in one or another population group.
At the same time, the relationship between the mini-
mum and average wage in Ukraine is completely 
within European norms. According to statistics from 
2009, this indicator was 50% in France, 49% in Great 
Britain, 43% in Poland, 32% for Spain, and 41% for 
Ukraine. Nevertheless, we need to remember that 
the calculations mentioned earlier use official data 
regarding the average wage, which does not reflect 
shadow wages and other distortions in Ukraine’s of-
ficial statistics. In reality, the relationship between 
these two indicators is much worse in Ukraine.
The main difference between Ukraine’s social stan-
dards and their European counterparts lies in the 
fact that these are vague, relative amounts that can 
rise or not based exclusively on political consider-
ations, largely without taking any economic dynam-
ics into account. Thus, despite the constant decla-
rations of politicians of all strips about the need to 
raise the standard of living of ordinary Ukrainians, 
they did not review the country’s social standards 
for years when the economy was growing steadily 
and the hryvnia was stable.
Nor is it any news to most people that Ukraine’s 
subsistence minimum and minimum wage are fairly 
difficult to even survive physically on. Meanwhile 
similar indicators in the European Union generally 
have two components: a smaller portion that reflects 
the amount necessary to simply survive and a larg-
er portion that is intended to cover all basic social 
needs and ensure the individual a minimum accept-
able standard of living within the society.
Fixing mistakes
The impact of social standards on Ukraine’s econ-
omy is not at all just a matter of social security or 
budgetary policy. It is much broader and the con-
sequences of decisions to raise them will be felt by 
every single Ukrainian. What, then, can be done 
to encourage more thoughtful social policies and 
a system of social standards that more effectively 
performs the function of social security for the most 
vulnerable social groups?
Firstly, what is worth doing is reviewing the system 
of government social guarantees in its entirety and 
the social security system. Right now, the country’s 
Budget carries an enormous burden due to the un-
imaginable number of wide-ranging privileges and 
other forms of social support that, too often, go not 
to those who are in greatest need of this support. 
Changing these privileges to the more contempo-
rary, transparent and effective instruments of tar-
geted social support will free up large volumes of 
public money and to direct them, among others, to-
wards raising social standards.
The relationship between individual social stan-
dards indicators should be established at the legis-
lative level. After all, the minimum pension cannot, 
a priori, be lower than the subsistence minimum or 
higher than the minimum wage.
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A subsistence minimum should be calculated on a 
household basis, not an individual basis. This will 
make it possible to more clearly establish actual 
needs and to reflect the economies of scale that 
arise when people live together. To make such cal-
culations more accurate, a number of different types 
of households should be defined and each of them 
designated their specific subsistence minimum. At 
the same time, such factors as where the family lives 
should also be taken into account as the costs of 
living in a village and in a major city differ signifi-
cantly.
In summary, we can say that raising social stan-
dards is a necessary and rational step, but it needs 
to be done not right now and not in the way that it 
was done. For social standards to stop being sim-
ply weights that are added to the scales of political 
horse-trading every election and to actually satisfy 
the basic needs of the poorest Ukrainians, they need 
to become more European in essence.
